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Reflections on the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 
by Professors 
John A. Lynch, Jr. Wendy G. Shaller 
Perhaps the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
an earthquake. But such earthquakes have 
become commonplace in taxation during 
the Reagan presidency. Maybe the volume 
of the 1986 Act was not much greater than 
that of 1984, 1982 or 1981. One thing is 
certain about the 1986 Act, how it has 
clearly made changes that significantly 
affect the lives of individual taxpayers. In 
these next few pages we would like to dis-
cuss a few of the changes which affect 
individual taxpayers. 
Alimony 
The 1986 Act simplified some of the ali-
mony rules, particularly those dealing with 
"alimony recapture." Alimony recapture is 
the amount which the paying spouse must 
subsequently include as income because he 
deducted too much money in the first few 
years after a divorce or separation in com-
parison to that paid in later years. Ali-
mony is sometimes bunched into early 
years in an attempt to recharacterize 
nondeductible property settlements as 
deductible alimony. Essentially, the ali-
mony recapture rules provide a means of 
attack on such recharacterization without 
the complex analysis of pre-1984 Act 
law.! 
The 1986 Act limits the liability for 
recapture to three years beginning with 
the year in which alimony is first paid 
("the first post-separation year").2 The 
new tax act eliminated the provision of the 
1984 Act which denied a deduction in 
excess of $10,000 per year for the payor of 
alimony if payments were not made in 
each of the first six post-separation years.3 
The modified rules apply to divorce or 
separation agreements executed after 1986 
or to any earlier agreements which are spe-
cifically modified to require the applica-
tion of the new law.4 For old agreements 
not so modified, the pre-1986 Act rules 
will continue to apply but only as to the 
first three post-separation years.5 
Recapture of alimony under the new law 
occurs, if at all, only in the third post-
separation year, and requires the payor to 
include any excess alimony payments from 
the first two post-separation years in his 
income in that third year. Also, in the third 
year, the payee, or recipient of alimony, is 
allowed a corresponding deduction.6 
To determine the total of any excess 
amounts for the first two post-separation 
years,? the taxpayer first computes any 
excess from the second post-separation 
year payments by adding $15,000 to the 
amount of third post-separation year pay-
ments and by then subtracting that 
amount from payments made in the 
second post-separation year.B Thus, if 
$30,000 was paid in the second post-
separation year and $10,000 in the third 
post-separation year, there would be 
$5,000 excess payment for the second post-
separation year [$30,000 - ($15,000 + 
$10,000)]. Then, the taxpayer computes 
excess payments for the first post-
separation year by a-dding the second post-
separation year payment ($30,000), reduc-
ed by any excess attributable to that year 
(in our example, $30,000 - $5,000 = 
$25,000), to the amount of third post-
separation payments ($10,000). That 
amount, $35,000 ($25,000 + $10,000), 
must be averaged, (i.e., divided by two: 
here equalling $17,500), and then increased 
by $15,000 ($17,500 + $15,000 = $32,500). 
Finally, this amount ($32,500) must be 
subtracted from the first post-separation 
year's payment.9 
Thus, in our example, if $60,000 in ali-
mony was paid in the first post-separation 
year, $27,500 would be recaptured with 
respect to the first post-separation year 
($60,000 - $32,500). Thus, in a third post-
separation year, a total of $32,500 ($27,500 
+ $5,000) would be included in the payor's 
income and $32,500 would be deductible 
by the payee spouse (or ex-spouse). 
Although the rules and calculations may 
still seem less than easy, they now only 
need to be computed in the third post-
separation year and only with respect to 
the first three years. 
The revisions to the "excess front-
loading" provisions of the 1984 Act were 
a bit surprising because they were riot 
included in President Reagan's May, 1985 
tax reform proposal,!O the report of the 
House Ways and Means Committee!! or 
the Senate Finance Committee.!2 
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Although the change is designated as a 
"technical correction" of the 1984 Act by 
the conference report,13 the impact of the 
change will be more than just technical. 
In providing for recapture of deducted 
alimony in the first six post-separation 
years in the 1984 Act, Congress created a 
powerful incentive for paying spouses to 
make payments per order or agreement. 
This was because fail~re to make required 
payments, in addition to subjecting the 
delinquent spouse to state contempt pro-
ceedings, would potentially create dis-
parities between the earlier and later years 
of the recapture period that would require 
alimony paid and deducted in earlier years 
to be recaptured. The halving ofthe recap-
ture period and the expansion of a permis-
sible variation in payments from $10,000 
to $15,000 in the 1986 Act will greatly 
reduce what might well have been an 
unintended boon for alimony recipients in 
the 1984 Act. 
In addition, the Code now no longer 
requires, that in order for alimony pay-
ments to be deductible, that the decree or 
agreement itself provide for the cessation 
of alimony payments after the death of the 
payee.14 It is now sufficient that local law 
or the instrument so provide. 
Business Meals 
The deductibility of business meals (and 
other entertainment) has been limited by 
the 1986 Act. Now, business meals, except 
those for a taxpayer "away from home," 
must conform to the "directly related" or 
"associated with" rules previously applied 
to other business entertainment.15 Moreo-
ver, the taxpayer must be present at such 
meal, 16 and expenses are deductible only to 
the extent of 80% of the taxpayer's cost, 17 
including any tax and tip. Therefore, if the 
taxpayer spends $50 on a meal and pays an 
additional $4 in tax and $10 in tips, $51.20 
(80% of $64) is the allowable deduction. 18 
Under prior law,19 business meals, 
unlike other entertainment, needed only 
to meet the "ordinary and necessary" 
requirement for business expenses general-
ly,20 and had to be furnished in a setting 
conducive to business discussion. This 
exclusion of business meals from general 
entertainment requirements was the statu-
tory basis for the storied "three-martini 
lunch." The application of the "directly 
related" or "associated with" standard to 
business meals will mean that there will be 
greater scrutiny of the relationship 
between the meals provided and the busi-
ness connection between the taxpayer and 
the recipient.21 
Although the 1986 Act requires that the 
meals not be "lavish or extravagant under 
the circumstances,"22 it does not define 
such limitations in terms of any specified 
cap; rather, Congress will look to the 
Internal Revenue Service and the courts to 
enforce this requirement.23 In addition, 
Congress contemplated that regulations 
would be promulgated to insure that busi-
ness meal expenditures would be strictly 
substantiated.24 
Excepted from the 80% limitation on 
deductibility are (1) meals wherein the full 
cost is taxed as compensation to the re-
cipient;25 (2) meals which conform to the 
exclusion for subsidized eating facilities or 
for de minimis fringe benefits;26 (3) meals 
for which the taxpayer is reimbursed 
(here, the reimburser is subject to the 
percentage limitations);27 (4) traditional 
employer provided recreation (e.g., a 
Christmas party);28 (5) samples distributed 
to the general public;29 (6) meals sold by 
the taxpayer for full and adequate consid-
eration;30 and, (7) for 1987 and 1988, meals 
which are integral to a "qualified" banquet 
meeting.31 
Capital Gains and Losses 
The long term capital deduction has 
been eliminated by the 1986 Act.J2 This 
does not mean, that it no longer makes any 
CCThe deductibility of 
business meals ... 
has been limited 
" 
difference to a taxpayer whether a transac-
tion involves a "capital asset" or whether 
that asset is held for a long or a short term. 
Taxpayers still need to compute net capital 
gains (the excess of net long term capital 
gains over net short term capital losses) 
because there is a new maximum net capi-
tal gains rate of 28%.33 Although capital 
will be taxed like any other income for 
years after 1987, in 1987, where the maxi-
mum tax bracket is 38.5%, net capital gains 
still receive a tax break in terms of the 28% 
maximum bracket to be applied to them.34 
Further, should Congress in future years 
add an additional, higher bracket, Con-
gress has already expressed its intention to 
keep the maximum net capital gains rate at 
28%.35 
Perhaps the most significant change 
brought by the 1986 Act concerning the 
capital asset inquiry is that it will shift 
attention to capital losses rather than capi-
tal gains. Short term capital losses in excess 
of long term gains have long been deducti-
ble dollar-for-dollar up to a $3,000 maxi-
mum of other income for most 
taxpayers.36 Under the 1986 Act, long 
term capital losses in excess of long term 
capital gains will now receive the same 
treatment.37 Capital losses are still netted 
against capital gains and, if they exceed 
capital gains, may offset up to $3,000 of 
other income.38 
Finally, a new issue may concern 
whether a loss is ordinary or capital (the 
latter being subject to the $3,000 per year 
maximum offset against other income). 
The Supreme Court's (yet to be rendered) 
decision in A rJ~ansas Best39 should clarify 
the issue of whether transactions are in the 
ordinary course of business and thus eligi-
ble for ordinary, fully deductible, losses. 
Income Shifting 
As long as there have been federal 
income taxes, heads of families with sub-
stantial income from property (unearned 
income) have attempted to spread such 
income to as many individuals as possible 
within the family. Spreading the income 
around to a number of family "taxpayers" 
circumvented the progressive tax rate 
structure and gave the family a lower fed-
eral tax bill. 
The "Clifford Rules"40 had restricted 
the ability of the "owner" of income pro-
ducing property to control the disposition 
of the income. Despite Congressional 
intent those rules may be seen as creating 
safe harbors rather than restrictions. If a 
taxpayer who placed money in trust gave 
up the forbidden powers specified in the 
rules for the requisite period of time, he 
was able to shift the income away from 
himself to the trust or a beneficiary. 
Trusts themselves have historically been 
regarded as separate taxpayers and tax 
avoidance through the use of trusts has 
been as American as apple pie.41 President 
Reagan's May 1985 tax reform proposal 
excoriated the use of trusts to avoid taxa-
tion.42 Although the new Act still treats 
trusts as separate taxpayers, it has imposed 
some significant new restrictions on 
income shifting. 
Perhaps the most important change in 
this respect has nothing specifically to do 
with trusts. The Internal Revenue Code 
now provides that the unearned income of 
a child who has not reached age 14 during 
the taxable year and either of the parents 
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of whom is alive shall be taxed at the rate 
of the parents.4J A tax, called the allocable 
parental tax, is calculated on all of the 
unearned income of children in the family 
under 14 years old as if it had been includ-
ed in the income of the parents. This tax 
is then allocated to such children in pro-
portion to the amount of unearned income 
each receives. The parent actually incurs 
no additional tax, but the total family tax 
bill for income from property is generally 
not reduced as much as has been possible 
in the past. 
This "parental tax" applies not only to 
income from property owned or formerly 
owned by parents but also to income from 
property the parents have never owned, 
such as property from other relatives or 
even investments derived from the earn-
ings of a child. Thus, the 1986 Act will 
remove income tax advantages from gifts 
under a gifts to minors act if the parents 
are in a higher tax bracket than the 
children. 
The 1986 Act also restricts the tax bene-
fits from shifting unearned income by tak-
ing away the personal exemption from an 
individual who may be claimed as a de-
pendent on the tax return of another.H 
The standard deduction of such an indivi-
dual is limited to $500 plus the amount of 
his or her earned income.45 
The elimination of the tax incentive to 
shift income to children under 14 years old 
may encourage parents to accumulate 
income in trusts, which are still treated as 
separate taxpayers, until such children 
reach age 14. However, the temptation to 
do this may be somewhat restricted by the 
substantial rate of increase in portions of 
the 1986 Act applicable to trusts in rela-
tion to other taxpayers.46 
The 1986 Act did not bring many 
changes to the "Clifford Rules," which 
restrict the ability of the grantors or 
transferors of income producing property 
to avoid taxation while maintaining con-
trol over the disposition of income from 
such property or retaining a power to get 
the property back. But, the Act eliminated 
the most popular tax avoidance device in 
this area which was popularly known as 
the "Clifford Trust."47 
A "Clifford Trust" was a trust which 
provided that the trust property would 
revert to the grantor only after the expira-
tion of 10 years.48 During this period, as 
long as the grantor had no power to 
revoke49 and otherwise adhered to the 
"Clifford Rules," the tax burden was shift-
ed away from the grantor so that the 
income from the trust property was taxed 
to the trust or to trust beneficiaries.50 Such 
income was, of course, generally taxable at 
lower rates than if the principal had been 
distributed to the grantor. Additionally, it 
could be used by beneficiaries for purposes 
the grantor would otherwise have provid-
ed for with after tax dollars. After 10 years 
and a day, the trust property could be 
returned to the grantor. 
The Code now provides that the grantor 
"Is the tax law 
fairer?" 
shall be treated as the owner of any por-
tion of a trust (hence taxable on the 
income of such portion) if he or she retains 
any reversionary interest the value of 
which exceeds five per cent of the value of 
such portion. The popular trusts in which 
money for education was accumulated for 
a minor child with a reversion to the 
parent grantor after a period of years 
would usually fail this test.51 This new rule 
does not apply (i.e., a safe harbor is creat-
ed) if a reversion retained by the grantor 
takes place only upon the death of a lineal 
descendent before age 21 so long as such 
descendent holds all present interests in 
such portion of the trust. 
These changes will clearly cause 
diminished interest in the use of trusts to 
accumulate, at lower tax rates, income for 
purposes such as college education 
expenses for one's children. They also 
reduce the income tax advantages of gifts 
to minors. It is ironic indeed, that while 
serious steps have been taken to preserve 
progressivity of income taxation within 
the family, the progressivity of the tax 
structure itself has been decreased because 
the pre-1987 rate structure has been reduc-
ed to two tax brackets. 
Interest 
The 1986 Act eliminates "personal" 
interest deductions for taxpayers other 
than corporations. 52 Personal interest is 
defined as interest which is not: 1) paid or 
incurred in connection with a trade or 
business, 2) investment interest, 3) interest 
taken into account in computing income 
or loss from a passive activity,53 4) quali-
fied residence interest or 5) interest paya-
ble on certain estate tax payments. 
Undoubtedly, the items most likely to 
be affected for most taxpayers by this 
change will be credit card interest and 
automobile financing. Home mortgage 
interest, particularly that which represents 
financing of the purchase price of two 
homes, is not as drastically affected. It will 
be fascinating to see whether this change 
will have significant effects upon consum-
er behavior. 
As noted above, an exception from the 
rule of nondeductibility has been made for 
qualified residence interest.54 This includes 
interest on indebtedness secured by a quali-
fied residence of the taxpayer. A qualified 
residence is the taxpayer's principal resi-
dence,55 and one other residence selected 
by the taxpayer for the taxable year.56 To 
the extent that interest is allocable to the 
principal of indebtedness which does not 
exceed the cost of a residence plus 
improvements, the interest is deductible 
regardless of what purpose the borrowed 
principal is used for.57 
As to any indebtedness in excess of the 
original cost of the residence, the interest 
on such indebtedness, incurred after 
August 16, 1986, is deductible only if loan 
proceeds are used for qualified medical 
expenses58 or qualified tuition expenses59 
of the taxpayer, spouse or dependent. 
Only the portion of residence 
indebtedness representing the difference 
between the cost of the residence and its 
value is subject to the medical or educa-
tional expense limitation. To the extent a 
homeowner has paid down his original 
mortgage, he may borrow up to the 
home's original cost, plus improvements, 
and use the proceeds for any purpose. The 
denial of personal interest is to be phased 
in over a four year period.60 
Conclusion 
All parties to the clamor for tax reform 
wanted to make the system simpler and 
fairer. The changes we have discussed 
herein would make one wonder whether 
the Code has been simplified. Is the tax law 
fairer? Some abuses have been greatly 
curbed but most tax breaks for middle and 
upper class individuals remain. Any 
increased "fairness" in reduction of such 
tax breaks has come at the cost of substan· 
tial erosion of the progressivity of the tax 
system. 
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